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RESURRECTING LABOR 
RICK BALES 
ABSTRACT 
 Participation in American labor unions has changed radically, 
albeit incrementally, over the last fifty years.  Private-sector union 
density has declined five-fold, whereas public-sector density has 
increased almost as significantly.  Today, unions rarely strike, and 
in much of the country, they are politically impotent.  As traditional 
manufacturing declines and is replaced by on-demand work, un-
ions risk becoming a historical footnote. 
 This Article ties the decline in union density and power to mac-
roeconomic trends that are highly troubling in an advanced de-
mocracy, such as rising income inequality and the failure of wage 
growth to keep pace with gross domestic product (“GDP”) 
growth.  It next reviews the traditional prescriptions that labor 
scholars have advocated to reverse labor’s decline.  Finally, it pro-
poses three new radical fixes: authorizing criminal prosecution for 
willful violations of labor law, expanding labor protections to on-
demand workers, and reversing the legal presumption that workers 
are not represented by a union unless they affirmatively opt in. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
American incomes and wealth are far less equal today than they were 
fifty years ago, and the inequality is growing.1  Though productivity and 
gross domestic product have risen, wages have not kept pace,2 meaning that 
                                                          
 1.  Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: 
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. ECON. 519, 520–21, 573 (2016). 
 2.  See infra Part III.B. 
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workers are not sharing in the economic gains to which they contribute.  So-
cial mobility has fallen commensurately,3 with significant political conse-
quences.4 
Over those same fifty years, unions have been in a deep decline.5  This 
decline has faced ambivalence from much of America’s heartland and joy 
from the business community,6 but its effects are deeply troubling.  Nonunion 
jobs pay less than union jobs and thus contribute to rising inequality.7  Much 
less acknowledged, and only now becoming better understood, is that high-
paying union jobs help increase wages, even the wages of nonunion workers,8 
and when the union jobs vanish, so does the wage premium for all workers.  
This Article ties, for the first time in the legal literature of which the author 
is aware, the precipitously increasing wage inequality that the United States 
has seen over the past two decades to the decline in union density. 
The decline in union density has been long noted by American legal and 
industrial relations scholars,9 who have equally long advocated changes to 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)10 to make it easier for workers 
to organize.11  This Article agrees that such changes are necessary, but it ad-
vances a reform agenda far beyond these traditional fixes. 
This Article argues that nothing short of a major overhaul of the NLRA 
will suffice to give workers the bargaining power to reverse the powerful 
headwinds of income inequality they now face and to restore the promise of 
the statute12 to give workers the ability to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of their employment.13  Part II describes the trends afflicting unions today: 
the decline in private-sector union density, the inability of unions to use 
strikes as an effective economic weapon, labor’s diminishing political power, 
the spread of right-to-work laws, the decline in manufacturing work, and the 
rise in contingent and on-demand work. 
                                                          
 3.  Michael D. Carr & Emily E. Wiemers, The Decline in Lifetime Earnings Mobility in the 
U.S.: Evidence from Survey-Linked Administrative Data 15–20 (Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth, 
Working Paper No. 2016-05, 2016), http://equitablegrowth.org/equitablog/the-decline-in-lifetime-
earnings-mobility-in-the-u-s-evidence-from-survey-linked-administrative-data/. 
 4.  MARK ROBERT RANK ET AL., CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: UNDERSTANDING WHAT 
SHAPES OUR FORTUNES 6 (2014).  
 5.  See infra Part II.A. 
 6.  See Marc Dixon, Limiting Labor: Business Political Mobilization and Union Setback in 
the States, 19 J. POL’Y HIST. 313, 336–38 (2007); see also Part II.A (discussing union decline). 
 7.  See infra Part III.C. 
 8.  See infra Part III.D. 
 9.  See William J. Moore & Robert J. Newman, A Cross-Section Analysis of the Postwar De-
cline in American Trade Union Membership, 9 J. LAB. RES. 111, 123 (1988). 
 10.  29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). 
 11.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 12.  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 13.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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Part III ties union decline to income inequality.  It first describes the rise 
in income inequality and the divergence of wage growth from productivity 
growth.  It then links these with declining unions by showing how the union 
wage premium has fallen and how union inability to “take wages out of com-
petition” drops the wages of nonunion workers.14 
Part IV is an agenda for reform.  It begins by reviewing the traditional 
prescriptions for reforming labor law: modifying various election rules to 
make it easier for workers to organize, restricting employers’ ability to hire 
replacement employees when unions strike, and reversing restrictions on un-
ion security clauses.  It then makes three more far-reaching proposals.  First, 
it builds on the longstanding understanding that the NLRA’s civil remedies 
are grossly inadequate and proposes criminal penalties for willful viola-
tions—much as the Mine Safety Act now permits criminal penalties for will-
ful violations that result in worker deaths.15  Second, it urges expanding 
NLRA protections to on-demand, gig-economy workers—much as a 2016 
Seattle municipal ordinance has.16  Third, it argues that the default on union 
representation should be changed from opt-out to opt-in—much like Con-
gress changed the rules for 401(k)s to dramatically increase participation 
rates.17 
These prescriptions are sketched rather than described in exhaustive de-
tail.  Any one of them would justify a full-length article.  The purpose here is 
to lay out a reform agenda that others can augment and add to and that can 
be implemented as soon as it becomes politically possible to do so. 
II.  UNION TRENDS 
American unions have weakened considerably over the last fifty years. 
Part II.A describes the decline in private-sector union density.  This decline 
in union density has led to the inability of unions to use strikes as an effective 
economic weapon, as described in Part II.B, and to labor’s diminishing po-
litical power, as described in Part II.C.  Labor’s diminishing political power 
is a cause or effect or both of the spread of right-to-work laws, described in 
Part II.D.  Contributors to union decline have been the decline in manufac-
turing work, described in Part II.E, and the rise in contingent and on-demand 
work, described in Part II.F. 
                                                          
 14.  Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 700 (2014). 
 15.  See 30 U.S.C. § 820(d) (2012) (penalizing violations of health and safety standards by fines 
or imprisonment). 
 16.  See infra Part IV.B.2.  
 17.  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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A.  Decline in Union Density 
Union membership peaked in the 1950s and has been declining ever 
since.18  As the chart below makes clear, private-sector union density halved 
between the late 1970s and early 1980s, and again between 1990 and 2009, 
falling to the single digits where it has remained for the last eight years.19 
Figure 120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although public-sector union density increased significantly in the 
1960s and early 1970s, and now far exceeds private-sector density, the pub-
lic-sector workforce is much smaller than the private-sector workforce,21 so 
union density overall is still in a steep net decline.  But even if unions could 
organize public-sector workers in sufficient numbers to offset private-sector 
losses, there still would be a significant overall net loss to worker bargaining 
power for four reasons. 
                                                          
 18.  John Schmitt, Union Membership Trends, 1948–2012, NO APPARENT MOTIVE (Jan. 25, 
2013, 10:13 AM), http://noapparentmotive.org/blog/2013/01/25/union-membership-trends-1948-
2012/. 
 19.  JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1 (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DATA TOOLS, https://www.bls.gov/data/ (last visited Sept. 9, 
2017); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE: UNION 
MEMBERSHIP (2017), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm [hereinafter ECONOMIC 
NEWS RELEASE].  
 20.  Schmitt, supra note 18.  For data that can be analyzed, sliced, and diced every which way, 
see ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE supra note19; BARRY HIRSCH & DAVID MACPHERSON, UNION 
MEMBERSHIP AND COVERAGE DATABASE FROM THE CPS, www.unionstats.com (last visited Sept. 
9, 2017).  
 21.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT EMPLOYMENT 
STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/ces/ (last visited July 3, 2017) [hereinafter CURRENT 
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS].  Though roughly half of all union members are public, public employ-
ment is roughly one-sixth of all wage and salary employment.  See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.re-
lease/union2.nr0.htm [hereinafter UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY]. 
 6 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1 
 
First, the laws of many states impede the ability of public-sector workers 
to organize and forbid such workers from engaging in collective bargaining.22  
Second, the percentage of American workers employed in the public sector 
has stayed largely constant—between 15–20%—since 1960; there are not 
enough public-sector workers to make up for the decline in private-sector 
union density.23  Thus, the total union density rate fell further in 2016 when 
private-sector union density declined to 10.7%, down 0.4% from 2015.24  
Third, the union wage premium—the degree to which union wages exceed 
nonunion-member wages—is significantly lower in the public sector than it 
is in the private sector, as the chart below illustrates.25  Wages for public-
sector workers, for example, often are set by legislators, not by collective 
bargaining.26  Fourth, the law often curtails the ability of public-sector work-
ers to use economic weapons—such as the strike—to a much larger degree 
than their private-sector counterparts do.27 
 
Figure 228 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 22.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 34–35. 
 23.  CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, supra note 21. 
 24.  UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY, supra note 21. 
 25.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 44–54. 
 26.  See MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 
619–734 (3d ed. 2016) (describing the wide variation among the states on the scope of permissible 
collective bargaining by public-sector workers). 
 27.  Id. at 735–98 (describing how, in the public sector, strikes are primarily a political rather 
than economic weapon, and often either are prohibited or are highly restricted and regulated). 
 28. ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 46. 
 2017] RESURRECTING LABOR 7 
 
B.  Disappearance of Strikes as an Economic Weapon 
As the chart below demonstrates, work stoppages have plummeted.  The 
solid line represents data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) on 
work stoppages (both strikes and lockouts) involving 1,000 or more work-
ers.29  Such stoppages peaked in the early 1950s, when 400–500 such stop-
pages occurred per year.30  They dropped in the early 1960s, rose again in the 
mid-1960s, and then began a sustained decline beginning in the early 1980s 
that culminated in a nadir of five stoppages in 2009.31  The dotted line repre-
sents data from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service on private-
sector, non-airline work stoppages and is not restricted to large work stop-
pages.32  It reflects a similar pattern for the limited number of years for which 
data are available.33  Note that these are absolute numbers—not percentages 
of the total workforce.  Thus, even as the American workforce has nearly 
tripled in size since 1950,34 the number of work stoppages has fallen drasti-
cally. 
 
Figure 335 
                                                          
 29.  Id. at 89 fig.4.1. 
 30.  Id. at 89. 
 31.  Id. at 89 fig.4.1. 
 32.  Id. at 88–89. 
 33.  Id. at 89 fig.4.1. 
 34.  See Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change: The U.S. Labor Force, 1950–2050, MONTHLY 
LAB. REV., May 2002, at 16 tbl.1 (noting that the size of the labor force was 62,208 people in 1950 
and 140,863 in 2000). 
 35.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 89 fig.4.1. 
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Historically, a decline in work stoppages was not necessarily a sign of 
union decline.36  Work stoppages in the 1950s and 1960s were counter-cycli-
cal—workers struck in good economic times when economic growth was in-
creasing, unemployment was falling, and wages were slow to respond to 
these economic pressures.37  As the chart above demonstrates, however, the 
current forty-year decline in work stoppages is constant—notwithstanding 
fluctuations in the business cycle.  Instead, the decline in work stoppages 
seems strongly tied to the decline in union leverage.38 
C.  Labor’s Diminishing Political Power 
Unions traditionally have influenced politics in two ways: by delivering 
votes and by spending money on political campaigns.  Both sources of influ-
ence have diminished significantly in the last several decades. 
In the middle part of the twentieth century, organized labor served as a 
political counterweight to the political power of big money and big busi-
ness.39  Although voter participation correlates strongly with socio-economic 
status (“SES”) (lower-SES status correlates with lower voter participation), 
unions historically cut across that grain by delivering the vote of a relatively 
high proportion of low-SES workers who, as a group, supported pro-labor 
policies that were economically progressive.40 
The ability of organized labor to deliver votes obviously diminishes 
commensurately with union density.  But even more than that, as Jake Rosen-
feld has recently demonstrated, the union vote premium—i.e., the participa-
tion rate above what demographics otherwise would suggest41—has fallen 
significantly in recent years as the face of unions has changed.42  For exam-
ple, as described above, union workers today are much more likely to be em-
ployed in the public sector than they were forty years ago.43  Public-sector 
workers—regardless of whether they are in a union—vote more often than 
private-sector workers.44  This leaves relatively little room for unions to cre-
ate a union vote premium by increasing their voter participation.  Rosenfeld 
estimates that in the 2008 election, the private-sector union vote premium 
                                                          
 36.  Id. at 90. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 92. 
 39.  Id. at 159. 
 40.  Id. at 163. 
 41.  Richard B. Freeman, What Do Unions Do . . . to Voting? 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 9992, 2003). 
 42.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 166–73. 
 43.  Id. at 44–45. 
 44.  Id. at 167. 
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was 5.1%, the public-sector vote premium was 0%, and the total union vote 
premium was 3.3%.45 
The second way that unions can influence politics is by donating money 
(and to some extent, their members’ volunteer time) to political campaigns.46  
However, unions’ ability to influence elections this way has been constrained 
significantly over the last several decades by two developments.  The first is 
restrictions the Supreme Court has placed on the ability of public-sector un-
ions to use union dues to fund political campaigns.  In Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education,47 the Supreme Court held that a public-sector union, while per-
mitted to bill non-members for chargeable expenses, may not require non-
members to fund its political and ideological projects.48  In Chicago Teachers 
Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson,49 the Court imposed procedural requirements 
that a union must meet to collect fees from non-members.50  Such procedures 
include a “Hudson notice” that the union must send every year to inform cov-
ered employees what that year’s agency fee will be and to notify them of the 
thirty-day period in which they can object to payment of the portion that is 
not for chargeable collective bargaining purposes.51  In Knox v. Service Em-
ployees Int’l Union, Local 1000,52 the Court held, “when a public-sector un-
ion imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide 
[employees] a fresh Hudson notice and may not [collect] funds from non-
members [until receiving] their affirmative consent.”53  Finally, in Friedrichs 
v. California Teachers Association,54 the Court granted certiorari on two is-
sues:  
[1] Whether Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), 
should be overruled and public-sector ‘agency shop’ arrangements 
invalidated under the First Amendment[, and (2)] [w]hether it vio-
lates the First Amendment to require that public employees affirm-
atively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sec-
tor unions, rather than requiring that employees affirmatively 
consent to subsidizing such speech.55   
                                                          
 45.  Id. at 180 fig.7.8. 
 46.  Id. at 159. 
 47.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 48.  Id. at 235–36. 
 49.  475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
 50.  Id. at 310. 
 51.  Id. at 307 n.18. 
 52.  567 U.S. 298 (2012). 
 53.  Id. at 322. 
 54.  136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 55.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. 1083 
(2016) (No. 14-915), 2015 WL 393856; Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n., No. 13-57095, 2014 
WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015) . 
 10 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1 
 
However, Justice Antonin Scalia died shortly after the case was argued 
in front of the Supreme Court, leaving only eight members to decide the case.  
The result was a non-precedential per curiam opinion affirming the lower-
court decision (in favor of the union) by an equally divided Supreme 
Court56—a result that likely will change with the appointment of Justice Gor-
such by a Republican president and a Republican-controlled Senate.57 
The second major recent constraint on unions’ ability to influence elec-
tions is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.58  In that case, the 
Supreme Court held (5-4) that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech pro-
tection prohibits the government from restricting independent political ex-
penditures by a nonprofit corporation.59  The statute the Court struck down 
similarly restricted political expenditures by unions.60 
There is a false equivalence, however, in the assumption that the effect 
of Citizens United is non-political because its principles apply to both com-
panies and unions.  Unions—especially given membership declines both in 
absolute terms and as a proportion of the population—cannot hope to match 
the campaign expenditures of companies.61  For example, in the 2000 election 
cycle (before Citizens United), business-related interests outspent unions by 
a ratio of fourteen to one.62  Unions historically might have countered being 
outspent by organizing their members to volunteer their time to political or-
ganizing, but diminished union numbers (and revenues from dues, which 
helps fund organizing of new members as well as political contributions) 
have removed whatever counter-balance they might once have provided.  
Even worse from unions’ perspective, the votes they managed to deliver in 
the 2016 election often went to a presidential candidate who has already taken 
steps to gut wage-and-hour laws, scrap Obama-era executive orders favoring 
labor, appoint to the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the 
Board”) and to the Supreme Court candidates hostile to labor, and support a 
national right-to-work law.63 
                                                          
 56.  Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. at 1083. 
 57.  Matt Ford, What’s Next for Justice Gorsuch?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/justice-gorsuch-cases/522513/; Harold Mey-
erson, Donald Trump Can Kill the American Union, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2016), www.washing-
tonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/23/donald-trump-could-kill-the-american-un-
ion/?utm_term=.7c1b8a471d0c. 
 58.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 59.  Id. at 365. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 181.  
 62.  Marick F. Masters, Unions in the 2000 Election: A Strategic Choice Perspective, 25 J. LAB. 
RES. 139, 167 tbl.12 (2004). 
 63.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellants, Nevada v. United States Dep’t of Labor, No. 16-41606 (5th 
Cir. June 30, 2017) (stating the DOL dropped its defense of the Obama Administration’s Fair Labor 
Standards Act overtime rule); Jeff Hirsch, Kaplan Confirmed to NLRB; Emanuel Vote Pushed Back, 
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D.  Right-to-Work Laws: A Demonstration of Union Political Futility 
Union shops and agency shops are union security clauses,64 negotiated 
by an employer and union as part of a collective bargaining agreement, that 
function as critical organizing and funding tools for unions.  A closed shop 
requires membership in the union as a condition for being hired and contin-
uing employment.  A union shop allows an employer to hire a nonunion 
worker but requires that the worker must join the union within a specified 
amount of time as a condition of continued employment.  An agency shop 
does not require the worker to join the union, but instead, requires the worker 
to pay a fee to the union to cover collective bargaining costs. 
Union security clauses are important to unions for two reasons.  First, 
there is bargaining strength in numbers.  Justice Holmes articulated this ar-
gument in Vegelahn v. Gunter.65  “Combination on the one side is patent and 
powerful,” he wrote, referring to the right of employers to organize in corpo-
rate and other combinations.66  “Combination on the other is the necessary 
and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal 
way.”67 
The second reason union security clauses are important to unions is be-
cause they prevent “free-riders.”  The federal labor law principle of exclusive 
representation68 requires unions to represent all members of a bargaining 
unit—in both contract negotiation69 and in grievance resolution70—regard-
less of whether the bargaining-unit member is a member of the union or pays 
union dues.  A union that fails in this “duty of fair representation” to a mem-
ber of the bargaining unit is subject to being civilly sued by the bargaining-
unit member,71 and may be liable for part of the member’s damages that were 
caused by the employer’s violation of the collective bargaining agreement.72  
                                                          
WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Aug. 2, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/la-
borprof_blog/2017/08/kaplan-confirmed-to-nlrb-emanuel-vote-pushed-back.html (noting steps 
taken to ensure Republican majority on NLRB); see also Steven Greenhouse, What Unions Got 
Wrong About Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/opin-
ion/sunday/what-unions-got-wrong-about-trump.html?_r=0 (noting that in the 2016 presidential 
election, (1) Trump won three critical rust-belt states: Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, (2) 
Clinton’s national share of the union vote was only 51%, and (3) in Ohio, Clinton lost among union 
households 49% to 44%). 
 64.  For a general definition and discussion of each type of union security clause, see TIMOTHY 
J. HEINSZ ET AL., LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 893 (6th ed. 2009). 
 65.  44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944). 
 69.  Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). 
 70.  Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). 
 71.  Id. at 179–80. 
 72.  Bowen v. USPS, 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983). 
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Thus, without a union-security clause, unions are forced to bargain for, and 
to represent in costly grievance proceedings, bargaining-unit members who 
are not members of the union and who do not financially support it.  Such 
“free-riding” workers get all the benefits of union representation without 
shouldering any of the cost; rational economic theory would predict that 
given this option, most workers would opt out of the union.73 
Before 1935, nearly all attempts by unions to negotiate union security 
clauses were declared illegal by the courts.74  The original Wagner Act per-
mitted all forms of union-security clauses.75  In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act76 
chose a more middle course—it outlawed closed shops but allowed union and 
agency shops, thus forbidding unions from requiring employers to only hire 
union workers.77 
The Taft-Hartley Act further limited union security clauses by allowing 
individual states (but not local governments, such as cities or counties) to 
outlaw the union shop and agency shop for employees working in their juris-
dictions.78  “About 22 states, largely in the South, the Great Plains, and the 
West, adopted [such] ‘Right to Work’ laws” by the early 1950s.79  From then 
until the 2000s, there was almost no change in the list of right-to-work states, 
though demographic migration from Rust Belt to Sun Belt states80 during that 
time significantly increased the proportion of workers affected by right-to-
work laws.81 
In recent years, however, and as Figure 4 illustrates, the right-to-work 
landscape has changed dramatically.  From 2012–2015, three key Rust Belt 
states (Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin) became right-to-work states, and 
West Virginia followed in 2016.82  State-level Republican gains in the 2016 
election in Missouri and Kentucky turned those states right-to-work in 
                                                          
 73.  See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 88 (1971) (arguing that a rational worker would not voluntarily contribute to 
a union). 
 74.  See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900) (issuing an injunction against union 
members for seeking to compel membership). 
 75.  See HEINSZ ET AL., supra note 64, at 893 (listing the forms of union security that were legal 
under the Wagner Act). 
 76.  29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012). 
 77.  See Local 357, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673 & n.7 (1961) 
(explaining that the Act outlaws closed shops except within specific circumstances). 
 78.  29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012) (codifying Section 14(b)). 
 79.  HEINSZ ET AL., supra note 64, at 893. 
 80.  That is, from areas in the Upper Midwest (Western Pennsylvania, Western New York, 
Ohio, Michigan, Northern Indiana, and Northern Illinois) to areas in the South and Southwest 
(Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, 
Florida, and South Carolina). 
 81. HEINSZ ET AL., supra note 64, at 893.   
 82.  Id. (providing the dates of enactment for state right to work laws).  
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2017.83  At the national level, congressional Republicans are likely to take up 
right-to-work legislation that would completely eliminate the ability of un-
ions to negotiate union-security clauses in their collective bargaining agree-
ments.84  The Washington Post has gone so far as to call Donald Trump’s 
2016 election “an extinction-level event for American labor.”85 
 
Figure 486 
 
 
 
E.  Decline in Manufacturing Work 
Manufacturing is a critical part of the U.S. economy—and a source of 
life support for unions that, as described above, otherwise are in deep trouble.  
Manufacturing industries generated $2.1 trillion in U.S. gross domestic prod-
uct (12.5% of total) in 2013.87  However, this significantly understates the 
                                                          
 83.  Id.; Greenhouse, supra note 63. 
 84.  Greenhouse, supra note 63; see also NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMM., NATIONAL RIGHT 
TO WORK ACT: NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK FACT SHEET, https://nrtwc.org/facts-issues/national-
right-to-work-act/ (last visited July 3, 2017) (arguing in favor of congressional right to work legis-
lation).  
 85.  Meyerson, supra note 57. 
 86. NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMM., RIGHT TO WORK STATES TIMELINE, 
https://nrtwc.org/facts-issues/state-right-to-work-timeline-2016/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017). 
 87.  ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 388, THE MANUFACTURING 
FOOTPRINT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. MANUFACTURING JOBS 6 (2015), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/the-manufacturing-footprint-and-the-importance-of-u-s-manufac-
turing-jobs/ [hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER NO. 388]. 
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role of manufacturing in the economy.  Manufacturing provides a significant 
source of demand for goods (for example, energy to power a factory, con-
struction to build it, and natural resources to serve as raw materials) and ser-
vices (for example, engineering, accounting, and legal work) in other sectors 
of the economy, and these “intermediate inputs” are not captured in measures 
of manufacturing sector GDP.88  They are counted in the broader measure of 
its gross output.89  Manufacturing is similarly critical to U.S. employment.  
The manufacturing sector in 2013 was responsible, directly or indirectly, for 
29.1 million U.S. jobs, or more than one-fifth (21.3%) of total U.S. employ-
ment.90 
Manufacturing is a particularly important provider of jobs with good 
wages for workers without a college degree.91  Much like unions create a 
union wage premium,92 manufacturing provides a manufacturing wage pre-
mium—the dollar amount by which the average manufacturing worker wage 
exceeds the wage of an otherwise comparable non-manufacturing worker.93  
“The average wage premium for U.S. manufacturing workers without a col-
lege degree was $1.78 per hour (or 10.9%) in 2012–2013 . . . .”94  Union den-
sity in manufacturing is considerably higher than in the private sector as a 
whole (9.4% v. 6.7% in 2015),95 but it is falling.96 
Unfortunately, both manufacturing output and the absolute number (not 
just the proportional number) of jobs in manufacturing are on a steady de-
cline.  Figure 5 below demonstrates both manufacturing’s large footprint on 
the American economy and the relatively consistent decline of manufacturing 
as a share of national GDP from 1997–2013.97  Over that time period, the 
United States lost 5.7 million manufacturing jobs.98  The primary reason for 
declines in manufacturing are globalization and trade.99 
  
                                                          
 88.  Id. at 7 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 367, TRADING AWAY THE 
MANUFACTURING ADVANTAGE: CHINA TRADE DRIVES DOWN U.S. WAGES AND BENEFITS AND 
ELIMINATES GOOD JOBS FOR U.S. WORKERS 6 & tbl.1 (2013). 
 92.  See infra notes 143–149 and accompanying text (describing the decrease in the union wage 
premium as union density decreases). 
 93.  BRIEFING PAPER NO. 388, supra note 87, at 8–9. 
 94.  Id. at 8. 
 95.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS—2015, USDL-
16-0158 at 1, 7 tbl.3 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01282016.pdf. 
 96.  Cf. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 388, supra note 87, at 9 (noting that in 2013, the union density 
rate in manufacturing was 10.1%). 
 97.  Id. at 7. 
 98.  Id. at 9.  
 99.  Id. 
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Figure 5100 
 
 
 
Figure 6 below demonstrates the commensurate decline in manufactur-
ing employment from 1970–2013.101 
 
Figure 6102 
                                                          
 100.  Id. at 8 fig.A. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 10 fig.B. 
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The decline of manufacturing work in the United States hurts unions in 
at least four ways.  First, as described above, workers in manufacturing are 
more likely to be organized, so declining manufacturing jobs means declining 
union rosters.  Second, workers in manufacturing jobs tend to think of them-
selves as workers rather than small-business entrepreneurs, as many workers 
in the gig economy do.103  Strict divisions between workers and their manag-
ers reinforce a sense of commonality among the workers, making them more 
amenable to union-organizing efforts. 
Third, factories are ideal places to organize.  Workers arrive and leave 
at uniform times on uniform shifts, making it relatively easy and efficient for 
unions to identify and reach out to them.  In a factory, the cost of labor is low 
relative to other costs of production such as the cost of the factory, machin-
ery, and raw materials.  This means that marginal increases in labor costs 
have relatively little effect on profits or product costs, giving management 
less incentive to resist organization than in the service or gig economy where 
labor costs represent a much higher percentage of the cost of production. 
Fourth, and related, high capital costs (i.e., the cost of the factory, ma-
chinery, and raw materials) make factories more vulnerable to strikes than 
employers in the service or gig economy, making employers more willing to 
negotiate at the bargaining table and in turn making the union more attractive 
to workers.  Unlike in many parts of the service and gig economy, workers 
are not fungible and easily replaced, because manufacturing jobs often are 
skilled—even specialized—jobs. 
                                                          
 103.  See infra text accompanying note 129 (noting the differences in identities between gig 
workers and employees). 
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F.  Rise in Contingent and On-Demand Work 
Existing labor and employment laws are predicated on the assumption 
of long-term, stable employment relationships.104  This assumption, however, 
has been eroding consistently for at least the last couple of decades.  It started 
with the transition from long-term employment relationships to contingent 
work—work expressly designed to be short-term, including independent con-
tractors (also called freelancers or consultants), on-call workers, and workers 
provided by temporary help agencies.105  That erosion has accelerated into a 
landslide over the last two to three years with the explosion of the on-demand 
or “gig” economy.106 
There is no set definition of gig work.107  It typically involves a single 
task or project and often is on-demand.108  The gig could last for weeks or 
months (in which case it resembles a short-term job) or for only a few 
minutes.109  A gig worker may take one gig at a time or juggle several at 
once.110  The recent explosion in the quantity of gig work is largely attribut-
able to the rise of companies (such as Uber111) connecting workers with gigs 
through websites or mobile applications (more commonly known as “apps”). 
The BLS stopped counting “contingent workplace” arrangements after 
2005,112 though it will start counting such arrangements again as part of the 
                                                          
 104.  KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR 
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE ix (2004); Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price- 
Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 249–50 (2017), (noting 
that a traditional employment relationship is “the conventional legal form for engaging labor,” 
against which “nontraditional” work is described, and which is both constituted and assumed by our 
current framework of labor regulation, originating in the New Deal). 
 105.  STONE, supra note 104, at ix.  The Government Accountability Office estimates that ap-
proximately forty percent of American workers are contingent.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, AND 
BENEFITS 4 (2015) (noting that under a broad definition of contingent work, 40.4% of the workforce 
were contingent workers in 2010). 
 106.  See infra notes 118–121 and accompanying text (providing statistics on the growth of the 
gig economy). 
 107.  Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS: CAREER OUTLOOK (May 2016), http://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/what-
is-the-gig-economy.htm.  
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See, e.g., Richard A. Bales & Christopher Patrick Woo, The Uber Million Dollar Question: 
Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Contractors?, 68 MERCER L. REV. 461, 466–67 (2017) 
(describing how the internet allowed companies, including Uber, to expand the sharing economy). 
 112.  Ian Hathaway & Mark Muro, Tracking the Gig Economy: New Numbers, BROOKINGS (Oct. 
13, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-the-gig-economy-new-numbers/ (Brook-
ings analysis of data from U.S. Census Bureau and Moody’s).  
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May 2017 Current Population Survey.113  As of 2005, the BLS estimated that 
contingent work accounted for 1.8%–4.1% of total employment, and that in-
dependent contractors constituted an additional 7.4% of total employment.114 
The void left by the BLS’s hiatus in counting contingent workers has 
led to widespread speculation about the size and growth of the gig econ-
omy.115  For now, the best estimate of the number of workers in the gig econ-
omy comes from a Census Bureau dataset of “nonemployer firms,” which 
count “‘businesses’ that earn at least $1,000 per year in gross revenues (or $1 
in construction) but employ no workers.”116  Approximately 86% of these 
“firms” are “self-employed, unincorporated sole-proprietors . . . .  In the rides 
and rooms industries, some 93 percent of the ‘firms’ are freelancers or con-
tractors.  These are exactly the types of workers who seek part-time work in 
the gig economy.”117  Thus, this dataset provides the best snapshot currently 
available of American workers in the gig economy. 
In the entire economy, these nonemployer firms grew from 15 million 
in 1997 to 22 million in 2007 to 24 million in 2014.118  Figure 7 below demon-
strates the growth of these nonemployer firms as compared to payroll em-
ployment. 
 
Figure 7119 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 113.  David McCabe, Administration Plans Labor Survey that Will Include On-Demand Jobs, 
THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2016, 4:58 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/266954-labor-department-
revives-survey-with-on-demand-economy-implications. 
 114.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE: 
CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS, USDL 05-1433, at 1 (2005), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm 
 115.  See, e.g., Micha Kaufman, Five Reasons Half of You Will Be Freelancers in 2020, FORBES 
(Feb. 28, 2014, 11:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michakaufman/2014/02/28/five-reasons-
half-of-you-will-be-freelancers-in-2020/#31d7ddb66d39; Jeremy Neuner, 40% of America’s Work-
force Will Be Freelancers by 2020, QUARTZ (Mar. 20, 2013), https://qz.com/65279/40-of-americas-
workforce-will-be-freelancers-by-2020/ (noting a study that estimates 60 million people will be 
contingent workers by 2020); Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, 
TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/ (estimating that at least 14 
million people currently work in the gig economy); see generally Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & 
The Future of Employment and Labor Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51 (2017) (advocating for systematic 
reforms in light of the growing gig economy).  
 116.  Hathaway & Muro, supra note 112.  
 117.  Id. at n.5. 
 118.  Hathaway & Muro, supra note 112.  Total U.S. payroll employment was 129 million in 
1997 and 145 million in 2014.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
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The rise of the gig economy is even more dramatic when limited to the 
ground transportation industry.  Figure 8 below demonstrates that the number 
of nonemployer firms in the ground transportation industry rose sharply in 
2010, the same year Uber launched in San Francisco.  It then exploded in 
2014—a trend that likely continues to the present.120  Ian Hathaway and Mark 
Muro explain: “In [2014] the nonemployer firm growth rate in ride-sharing 
was 34 percent, compared with 4 percent for payroll employment in the in-
dustry.  Between 2010 and 2014, nonemployer firms in ride-sharing grew by 
69 percent while payroll employment grew by just 17 percent.”121 
Figure 8122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The consequence of the rise in the gig economy, especially if it occurs 
at the expense of traditional employment relationships, is that gig workers 
are much more difficult to organize into unions.  This is so for two reasons.  
First, they may be “independent contractors” instead of “employees.”  Inde-
pendent contractors are specifically excluded from protection by the 
                                                          
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
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NLRA,123 and attempts by independent contractors to organize and bargain 
collectively may violate antitrust laws.124  The status of gig economy workers 
as employees versus independent contractors has been widely litigated125 and 
theorized,126 but almost exclusively in the context of wage, hour, and benefit 
disputes,127 not in the context of whether the workers can organize into un-
ions.128 
Second, workers in the gig economy may think of themselves as indi-
vidual entrepreneurs and not as workers with a collective interest.129  Uber 
drivers, for example, set their own schedules, work alone, and drive their own 
cars.130  However, as Catherine Fisk has shown, Hollywood writers have bar-
gained collectively for eighty years despite working in a gig (albeit non-web-
based platform) economy.131  Independent, entrepreneurial, short-term work-
ers can organize and bargain collectively if given the opportunity, motive, 
and legal protection to do so.132 
                                                          
 123.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012); see also NLRB v. United Ins. 
Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (applying general agency law principles to determine 
whether insurance agents were employees or independent contractors under the NLRA). 
 124.  See Catherine Fisk, Hollywood Writers and the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 15–16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2858572 (analyzing historical precedent on whether independent contractors violate anti-
trust laws by acting in concert); Paul, supra note 104, at 11 (describing the legal theory under which 
Uber workers would violate antitrust laws by engaging in collective bargaining); Sanjukta M. Paul, 
The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
969, 977 (2016) (discussing the status of independent contractors under antitrust laws); Elizabeth 
Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights for “Dependent 
Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 169–70 (2005) (describing the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of independent contractors under the Sherman Act). 
 125.  See Miriam A. Cherry, Gig Economy: Settlements Leave Labor Issues Unsettled, (St. Louis 
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2776213 (listing cases where gig economy workers sought the benefits associated with 
employment). 
 126.  See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of 
Work, 39  COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. (forthcoming 2017), ssrn.com/abstract=2734288 (discussing 
litigation surrounding gig economy workers’ status and analyzing how the gig economy is trans-
forming work); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the 
Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673 (2016) (advocating for a new approach to delineating em-
ployment); Bales & Woo, supra note 111 (arguing that current legal tests do not provide clear an-
swers as to whether Uber drivers are employees or independent contractors).  
 127.  Cherry, supra note 125. 
 128.  Cf. Fisk, supra note 124 (using Hollywood writers as a case study in whether gig-like 
workers can, both legally and practically, organize into a union). 
 129.  V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Iden-
tities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 104–20 (2017); Fisk, supra note 124, at 1. 
 130.  Bales & Woo, supra note 111, at 6. 
 131.  Fisk, supra note 124, at 2. 
 132.  See generally id. (discussing why and how Hollywood, a gig economy, decided to union-
ize). 
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III.  CORRELATES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNION DECLINE 
By just about any conceivable measure, the economic picture of wages 
over the last several decades is bleak.  Wages have stagnated, have become 
significantly less equal, and have failed to keep pace with GDP.133  Correla-
tion, of course, is not necessarily causation; factors contributing to this pic-
ture may include globalization, technological change, education levels, and 
the mobility of capital relative to labor.  However, a growing body of research 
suggests strongly that the decline of unions is responsible for a significant 
measure of wage stagnation and inequality. 
A.  Rising Income Inequality 
As demonstrated below in Figure 9, from 1979–2007 the average in-
come of the top 1% rose dramatically, the average income of the top 20% 
rose less robustly, and the average income of everyone else rose marginally 
at best.  For uneducated men, the trend is particularly brutal—nonunion men 
in the private sector with a high school education or less experienced a real-
wage loss of 13% from 1979–2013.134  Real wages for all nonunion men dur-
ing that time frame were relatively flat.135  Real wages for nonunion women 
with a high school education or less declined slightly, while the one bright 
spot was that wages for all women rose 27%.136  Educated women did rela-
tively well over this time period; everyone else flat-lined or back-tracked.137 
 
Figure 9138 
 
                                                          
 133.  See infra Parts III.A–III.B. 
 134.  JAKE ROSENFELD ET AL., ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, UNION DECLINE LOWERS 
WAGES OF NONUNION WORKERS 3 (2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/union-decline-lowers-
wages-of-nonunion-workers-the-overlooked-reason-why-wages-are-stuck-and-inequality-is-grow-
ing/. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 3, 4 fig.A. 
 137.  Id. at 3. 
 138.  CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INCOME GAINS AT THE TOP DWARF THOSE OF 
LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS, https://www.cbpp.org/income-gains-at-the-top-dwarf-
those-of-low-and-middle-income-households-3 (last visited Oct. 3, 2017). 
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Figure 10 below juxtaposes the share of income going to the top 10% 
with the union density rate.139  It illustrates graphically the strong positive 
correlation of union density and wage equality over nearly the entire last cen-
tury. 
  
                                                          
 139.  Id. 
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Figure 10140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Divergence of Wage Growth from GDP Growth 
A second disturbing trend, illustrated by Figure 11 below, is that since 
1980, wage growth for most workers has failed to keep pace with GDP 
growth.141  Workers are not sharing in the prosperity they are creating.  
Though this trend correlates with declining union density, correlation is not, 
of course, causation.  Nonetheless, it is probably reasonable to assume that if 
unions were stronger, they would be demanding (and getting) a bigger piece 
of the pie created by productivity gains. 
  
                                                          
 140.  Will Kimball & Lawrence Mishel, Unions’ Decline and the Rise of the Top 10 Percent’s 
Share of Income, ECON. POLICY INST. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/unions-de-
cline-and-the-rise-of-the-top-10-percents-share-of-income/. 
 141.  See David Autor et al., Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share 1 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23108, 2017), www.nber.org/papers/w23108 (noting that 
“there is consensus that there has been a decline in the U.S. labor share since the 1980s particularly 
in the 2000s”).  
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Figure 11142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  Declining Union Wage Premium 
Unions walk a fine line in attempting to raise wages.  Raise them too 
high, and the firm or industry becomes less competitive, and union members 
lose jobs.  Fail to raise them high enough, and worker interest in joining and 
supporting a union wanes. 
Thus, one of the key goals of any labor organization is to “take wages 
out of competition.”143  Taking wages out of competition in a particular in-
dustry means establishing a wage floor so that rival companies will not com-
pete by a race-to-the-bottom on wages144—they instead will compete on in-
novation and efficiency and other non-wage factors.  Achieving this, 
however, requires unions to achieve sufficient union density in the industry 
such that nonunion firms cannot attract qualified labor without paying the 
union wage rate or something close to it. 
As described above in Part II.A, however, union density rates have been 
falling, especially in the private sector.  Public-sector density rates have risen, 
though not nearly enough to offset private-sector losses.  As Figure 2145 illus-
trates, the union wage premium in the public sector is smaller than in the 
                                                          
 142.  Frank J. Lysy, Why Wages Have Stagnated While GDP Has Grown: The Proximate Fac-
tors, AN ECONOMIC SENSE BLOG, (Feb. 13, 2015, 6:45 PM), https://aneconom-
icsense.org/2015/02/13/why-wages-have-stagnated-while-gdp-has-grown-the-proximate-factors/. 
 143.  Dimick, supra note 14, at 700; see also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503 
(1940) (“[E]limination of price competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective 
of any national labor organization.”). 
 144.  See Dimick, supra note 14, at 700–01 (describing the rationale behind coordinating wages 
across a market). 
 145.  See supra Part II.A. 
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private sector, so it should not be surprising that the overall union wage pre-
mium likewise is falling.146 
Figure 2 also illustrates, however, that even in the private sector, the 
union wage premium is falling, though not precipitously.  Figure 2 obscures, 
however, the divergence over the last 30 years of the union wage premium 
earned by men versus women.  In 1974, the private-sector union wage pre-
mium for both sexes was about 21%.147  By 2009, however, the wage pre-
mium for men had risen to about 26% while the premium for women had 
dropped to about 17%.148  Factors that likely explain this disparity include 
the higher proportion of men working in manufacturing, construction, and 
transportation—which still command significant union wage premiums—
and the higher proportion of women working in the service industry and ed-
ucation—which do not.149 
D.  Disassociation of Nonunion Wages from Union Wages 
Some forty years ago, nonunion companies often looked to their union 
counterparts as a benchmark for wages and benefits.150  They did so for three 
reasons.  One was union-avoidance.  Nonunion companies feared that going 
union would mean ceding workplace control, inviting the possibility of a dis-
ruptive strike, and paying union-scale wages, so they voluntarily offered 
near-union-scale wages151 on the theory that “two out of three ain’t bad.”152  
The second reason was to attract qualified workers—if unions had succeeded 
in taking wages out of competition, all the good workers would work for un-
ion shops, and a company offering wages well below the norm would be un-
able to attract qualified workers.153  The third reason was that unions served 
as a cultural force pushing—sometimes politically, sometimes socially—for 
workers to receive a “fairer share.”154  Unions even helped lift the pay of the 
low- and mid-level managers on the management rungs above them because 
                                                          
 146.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 71. 
 147.  Id. at 73. 
 148.  Id. at 72 fig.3.1. 
 149.  Id. at 73. 
 150.  FRED K. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES 153–54 
(1980). 
 151.  Id. at 154. 
 152.  MEATLOAF, Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad, on BAT OUT OF HELL (Epic Records 1977). 
 153.  FOULKES, supra note 150, at 156. 
 154.  ROSENFELD ET AL., supra note 134, at 6; see also LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHEW 
WALTERS, ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 143, HOW UNIONS HELP ALL WORKERS 8 
(2003), http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/. 
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companies were loath to pay supervisors less than the workers they super-
vised.155  Consequently, as Fred Foulkes noted in 1980, “the activities of 
many unions in the United States are benefitting many nonmembers; in other 
words, unions are doing much good for many people who do not pay them 
any dues.”156 
Today, however, the situation is often reversed.  Many union companies 
look to their nonunion competitors as a benchmark on wages and benefits.157  
With unions becoming a diminished threat to organize158 and a nearly non-
existent threat to strike, the nonunion company “today has little incentive to 
match union wage[s].”159  Moreover, even if the union wage premium retains 
some of its former vitality, its influence on the larger labor market has dimin-
ished significantly with the decline in union density.  “After all,” writes Jake 
Rosenfeld, “a large union wage premium means little if only a tiny fraction 
of the population receives it.”160  Private-sector union decline since the 1970s 
has contributed to substantial wage losses among workers who do not belong 
to a union.161  Union decline can explain about one-third of the growth in 
wage inequality among men, and about one-fifth of the growth of wage ine-
quality among women—from 1973–2007.162  Union decline contributed sub-
stantially more to wage loss from 1979–2013163 than increased trade with 
low-wage nations.164  The 2016 presidential candidates missed the boat: in-
stead of targeting free trade as a cure for job loss, they should have been 
targeting the decimation of American unions. 
                                                          
 155.  Jake Rosenfeld, Widening the Gap: The Effect of Declining Unionization on Managerial 
and Worker Pay, 1983–2000, 24 RES. IN SOC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 223, 235 (2006). 
 156.  FOULKES, supra note 150, at 154. 
 157.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 70. 
 158.  Declining Employee Loyalty a Casualty of the New Workplace, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON 
(May 9, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/declining-employee-loyalty-a-casu-
alty-of-the-new-workplace/ (“Unions are on the decline.  It’s easy to quash them if they try to or-
ganize.”). 
 159.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 78.  For a comprehensive examination of the union wage 
gaps and how they have changed over time, see BARRY T. HIRSCH & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, 
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK: COMPILATIONS FROM THE CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEY tbls.2a–2c (BNA 2016). 
 160.  ROSENFELD, supra note 19, at 76. 
 161.  ROSENFELD ET AL., supra note 134, at 1. 
 162.  Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 
76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 514 (2011). 
 163.  ROSENFELD ET AL., supra note 134, at 1. 
 164.  See JOSH BIVENS, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 354, USING STANDARD 
MODELS TO BENCHMARK THE COSTS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR AMERICAN WORKERS WITHOUT A 
COLLEGE DEGREE 2 (2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/standard-models-benchmark-costs-
globalization/ (“[G]rowing trade with less-developed countries lowered wages in 2011 by 5.5 per-
cent . . . .”). 
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The direct causal effect of union decline on wage rates and inequality is 
described in detail in the 2016 Economic Policy Institute report Union De-
cline Lowers Wages of Nonunion Workers,165 and I will only summarize the 
findings here.  For nonunion, private-sector men, weekly wages would be 5% 
higher in 2013 if union density had remained at its 1979 level.166  Non-col-
lege-graduate men would have earned 8% more, and men with a high school 
diploma or less would have earned 9% more.167  The effect on women would 
not have been as substantial because women were not as organized as men in 
1979, but even so they still would have earned 2–3% more.168 
The loss in weekly wages is illustrated below by Figure 12, and the un-
ion density effect on nonunion wages by Figure 13.  The numbers may not 
seem huge at first glance, but the aggregate annual loss in nonunion wages 
from union decline is approximately $133 billion.169  This does not include 
the annual loss in union wages caused by the dramatic decline in union den-
sity over this time period.170 
 
Figure 12171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 165.  ROSENFELD ET AL., supra note 134, at 1.  Calculations from Jake Rosenfeld and the Eco-
nomic Policy Institute basically ask the following: Let’s assume both that union coverage and their 
effects on wages seen in the past held constant over time.  Id.  If so, what level of union density and 
earnings would we have now?  Id.  That is an interesting question to ask and the results are informa-
tive.  But it does not follow that there existed any policies (politically feasible or not) that might 
have produced constant union density and wage effects.  This is particularly so if technological 
change and globalization are principal reasons for changes over time.  
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 2.  
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 1–2 (describing loss for men is $109 billion and loss for women is $24 billion). 
 170.  Id. at 3 (“[F]or all of our analyses, we exclude the wages of union workers, as this report’s 
focus is on trends in nonunion pay in the private sector.”). 
 171.  Id. at 13 fig.C. 
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Figure 13172 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV.  PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
The figures and numbers in Parts II and III are deeply disturbing, and 
reversing them will require strong medicine.  Part IV begins by reviewing the 
traditional prescriptions for reforming labor law: modifying various election 
rules to make it easier for workers to organize, restricting employers’ ability 
to hire replacement employees when unions strike, and reversing restrictions 
on union security clauses.  It then makes three more far-reaching proposals.  
First, it builds on the longstanding understanding that the NLRA’s civil rem-
edies are grossly inadequate and proposes criminal penalties for willful vio-
lations—much as the Mine Safety Act now permits criminal penalties for 
willful violations that result in worker deaths.  Second, it urges expanding 
NLRA protections to on-demand, gig-economy workers—much as a 2016 
Seattle municipal ordinance has.  Third, it argues that the default on union 
representation should be changed from opt-out to opt-in—much like the rules 
for 401(k)s were changed to dramatically increase participation rates. 
A.  The Traditional Prescriptions 
The decline of American unions is no secret, and academics and union 
advocates have offered plenty of prescriptions over the last several decades. 
This section discusses those prescriptions. They include easing union elec-
tion rules, for example, by giving unions accurate and useful information 
(e.g., cell numbers and email addresses) of workers in the proposed bargain-
ing unit, giving unions meaningful pre-election access to workers, giving un-
ions equal speech rights in election campaigning, and allowing workers to 
form a union based on anonymously signed cards rather than having to en-
dure an election. Other traditional prescriptions include restricting the ability 
                                                          
 172.  Id. at 22 fig.I. 
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of employers to hire replacement workers during strike, which in turn would 
decrease the ability of employers to break strikes and increase unions’ bar-
gaining power; and either reversing restrictions on union security clauses, or 
reducing the burden on unions to represent non-members. 
1.  Ease the Election Rules 
A fundamental premise of federal labor law since the 1920s is that “pub-
lic policy favors the right of workers to form [labor] organizations of their 
own choosing, to” bargain for and represent them in the workplace.173  This 
premise is built on two goals: (1) equalizing workers’ bargaining power with 
companies and enabling them to negotiate better wages and working condi-
tions than they would otherwise, and (2) providing an administrative (and 
arbitral) process for resolving conflicts between workers and companies to 
reduce the number and destructiveness of industrial conflict.174  The goals 
cannot be realized, however, if workers are unable to organize effectively. 
The NLRA requires that a union have “majority”175 support before it can 
represent a given set of workers, and gives the Board the authority to deter-
mine, through secret ballot elections, when a union has obtained such sup-
port.176  Before seeking an election, a union must obtain signed authorization 
cards from at least thirty percent of the workers.177  A union obtaining a large 
majority can request immediate recognition from the employer,178 but the 
employer does not have to give it,179 and seldom does.180 
The union then petitions the Board for an election.181  Within seven days 
of ordering an election, the company must file with the NLRB Director a list 
of employees eligible to vote in the election, together with their addresses 
and phone numbers (this is known as an “Excelsior list” after the name of the 
                                                          
 173.  Samuel Estreicher, “Easy In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace Representation, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2014). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). 
 176.  Id. § 159. 
 177.  Id. The statute says a “substantial number,” but the Board has consistently interpreted the 
threshold as 30%, consistent with the 30% threshold in the statute for triggering a decertification 
election.  Id. §§ 159(c)(1)(A), 159(e); see NLRB, What We Do / Conduct Elections, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (“To start the elec-
tion process, a petition and associated documents must be filed, preferably electronically, with the 
nearest NLRB Regional Office showing support for the petition from at least 30% of employees.”). 
 178.  See, e.g., Harry C. Katz et al., The Revitalization of the CWA: Integrating Collective Bar-
gaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 573, 578–79 (2003) (noting 
the Communication Workers of America’s (“CWA”) practice of receiving union recognition with-
out NLRB elections). 
 179.  NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969). 
 180.  JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS: WHY LABOR LAW IS FAILING 
AMERICAN WORKERS 15 (2016); Estreicher, supra note 173, at 1627. 
 181.  29 U.S.C. § 159(c). 
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Board case establishing the rule182).183  In the weeks leading up to the elec-
tion, both the union and the company conduct rival, often bitter,184 campaigns 
to persuade workers to vote either for or against the union. 
These elections are grossly one-sided and are permeated by employer 
conduct that is formally illegal but continues nonetheless.  A study by Kate 
Bronfenbrenner, for the Economic Policy Institute, catalogs the malfeasance 
that occurs regularly in union elections: 
In the NLRB election process[,] it is standard practice for workers 
to be subjected to threats, interrogation, harassment, surveillance, 
and retaliation for union activity. . . .  [E]mployers threatened to 
close the plant in 57% of elections, discharged workers in 34%, 
and threatened to cut wages and benefits in 47% of elections.  
Workers were forced to attend anti-union one-on-one sessions with 
a supervisor at least weekly in two-thirds of elections.  In 63% of 
elections employers used supervisor one-on-one meetings to inter-
rogate workers about who they or other workers supported, and in 
54% used such sessions to threaten workers.185 
Such tactics are possible because the election rules governing union 
campaigns significantly favor employers, and remedies for illegal employer 
conduct are exceptionally weak.  To resurrect labor, the rules should be re-
written to achieve at least neutrality, and ideally to favor workers. 
a.  Give Unions an Excelsior List for the Twenty-First Century 
In the 1966 Excelsior Underwear decision, the Board ruled that “within 
7 days after . . . the Board has directed an election . . . the employer must file 
with the Regional Director an election eligibility list,” which would then be 
turned over to the union.186  In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,187 the Supreme 
Court upheld the Board’s authority to require Excelsior lists, noting that the 
“disclosure requirement . . . encourag[es] an informed employee electorate 
and [allows] unions the right of access to employees that management al-
ready possesses.”188 
Employer compliance with this requirement is regular, but perfunctory 
and incomplete.  The lists provided to the Director (and thence to the union) 
                                                          
 182.  Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239 (1966). 
 183.  29 U.S.C. § 159(c). 
 184.  Estreicher, supra note 173, at 1627. 
 185.  KATE BRONFENBRENNER, ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 235, NO HOLDS 
BARRED: THE INTENSIFICATION OF EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING 1–2 (2009), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp235/. 
 186.  Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239. 
 187.  394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
 188.  Id. at 767. 
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“are never totally accurate and are often filled with wrong names and old 
addresses.”189  In a digital era, where having accurate employee information 
is critical, not only for internal reasons but also for tax and all kinds of other 
regulatory compliance purposes, submitting bad data is inexcusable.  The 
current iteration of the Excelsior rule is also woefully out-of-date, as the Ex-
celsior expectations were set (apparently in stone) before cell phones, email 
addresses, and social media. 
The Excelsior disclosure requirements should be expanded to include, 
at a minimum, cell phone numbers and email addresses.190  Additionally, to 
ensure meaningful compliance, and in recognition of the relative ease of the 
employer (compared to the union) of obtaining this data, any eligible voter 
not listed, or listed with incorrect contact information, should be counted as 
“yes” votes for the Union unless that voter individually and specifically indi-
cates otherwise on an authorization card or at the ballot box, and an em-
ployer’s failure to provide correct information that the employer in fact has 
should be an unfair labor practice. 
Accurate phone numbers and email addresses are far from sufficient, 
however, to guarantee free and fair union elections.  Face-to-face contact be-
tween union organizers and workers is imperative, because employees often 
decide whether to vote for the union based on their assessment of the union 
organizer.191  For this reason, it is also important to give unions meaningful 
pre-election access to workers at their place of employment. 
b.  Give Unions Meaningful Pre-Election Access to Workers 
The right of employees to self-organize, guaranteed by the NLRA, de-
pends to a large degree on the ability of workers to learn about the advantages 
of organization from union representatives.192  However, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 189.  GETMAN, supra note 180, at 19. 
 190.  The new election rules partially address this by requiring a personal email and phone num-
ber if the employer has it.  See 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308, 74,310 (Dec. 15, 2014) (providing a list of the 
2014 amendments to the election rules).  For a description of these rules (including a section on 
Excelsior and a short plea for even more electronic addresses), see Jeffrey M. Hirsch, NLRB Elec-
tions: Ambush or Anticlimax?, 64 EMORY L. REV. 1647, 1654–57 (2015). Employer privacy con-
cerns could be alleviated by allowing employees to affirmatively tell the employer that they do not 
wish for their personal contact information to be provided as part of the Excelsior list. For a general 
argument that employees should be able to opt in and out of electioneering processes, see Michael 
M. Oswalt, The Content of Coercion (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 191.  GETMAN, supra note 180, at 22. 
 192.  NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). 
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has held that employer property rights193 are more important than worker as-
sociational rights.194  As a consequence, during a union representation elec-
tion, the company enjoys nearly unlimited access to employee voters, 
whereas the union’s access is severely restricted at best. 
The first major decision favoring property rights over associational 
rights occurred in the 1956 case of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox.195  In that 
case, the Supreme Court reversed a Board decision requiring the company to 
give union organizers access to its parking lot.196  The Board had concluded 
that, without such access, the union would be at a serious disadvantage in 
getting its message to the workers.197  The Court, without addressing the un-
ion’s disadvantage, nonetheless held that the Board had erred by giving the 
union organizers access to the company’s property as if they had been em-
ployees.198 
The second major decision was Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,199 in which the 
Court again reversed a Board decision ordering a company to allow union 
organizers access to the company’s parking lot.200  The Court held that the 
Board’s decision “erod[ed] Babcock’s general rule that ‘an employer may 
validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union litera-
ture.’”201  To get access to employees on company property, the Court said, 
a union must show that “‘no other reasonable means of communicating its 
organizational message to the employees exists,’” such as mailings, phone 
calls, home visits, or displaying signs across the street from the company’s 
parking lot.202 
The result of these decisions is that union election campaigns are ex-
traordinarily one-sided.  Companies have instant and unfettered access to 
workers and nearly always exploit this opportunity to drive home the anti-
union message.  As Julius Getman explains,  
[An] antiunion employer can announce to employees when they 
are hired that the company is nonunion, and wants to stay that way.  
It can show antiunion films or CDs at various times throughout the 
                                                          
 193.  For an excellent discussion of the Supreme Court’s focus on employer property rights, and 
the contrasting focus of Canadian courts on workers’ rights, see Martin H. Malin, Extending Mike 
Zimmer’s Cross-Border Comparative Work: The Role of Property Rights in U.S. and Canadian 
Labo(u)r Law, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 417 (2016). 
 194.  NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 106, 114.  
 197.  Id. at 107. 
 198.  Id. at 112. 
 199.  502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 200.  Id. at 530, 541. 
 201.  Id. at 538 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112).  
 202.  Id. at 535, 540 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978)). 
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workplace.  It can have its supervisors engage in discussions with 
the employees, and it can fill its message boards with antiunion 
arguments and slogans.203 
The structure of the NLRA is predicated on the notion that workplaces 
are best structured as mini-democracies, with workers voting for representa-
tion in free and fair elections.204  However, thanks to the Supreme Court’s 
favoring of company property rights over worker associational rights, elec-
tions for union representation are anything but free and fair.  Instead, they are 
more akin to the “elections” held in many developing countries in which a 
longstanding dictator owns or controls all media outlets, exiles political op-
ponents, and punishes critics with impunity.205 
Unions should be given fair access to workers in representation elec-
tions so they can make a free and informed choice about union representation.  
This necessarily means giving union representatives access to workers on 
company property to permit face-to-face communication,206 and if an em-
ployer uses company time to speak with workers (individually or collec-
tively) to oppose the union, the union should be provided a commensurate 
opportunity to respond.  If the Supreme Court continues to insist that em-
ployer property and speech rights forbid this and trump worker associational 
rights, then the NLRA election rules should be redrafted to provide for snap 
elections (i.e., ten to fifteen days compared to the current process of about 
thirty days) before the company can gear up for an anti-union campaign.  Bet-
ter to have minimal campaigning on both sides than to have campaigning that 
is grossly lopsided. 
c.  Give Unions Equal Speech Rights in Union Campaigns 
A “captive audience speech,” in the union-organizing context, is an anti-
union speech by an employer to its workers, during work time, that workers 
are required to attend on pain of discipline or discharge.207  The workers 
rarely have an opportunity to question the presenter.  The “speech” today 
often is a multi-media presentation crafted and perhaps delivered by a pro-
fessional union-busting company, and there often are multiple such speeches 
                                                          
 203.  GETMAN, supra note 180, at 22. 
 204.  CLINTON S. GOLDEN & HAROLD J. RUTTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY 42–43 (1942); Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 276 (1948). 
 205.  See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 185, at 25 (“This combination of threats, interrogation, 
surveillance, and harassment has ensured that there is no such thing as a democratic ‘secret ballot’ 
in the NLRB certification election process.”). 
 206.  See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act 
Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 15–16 (2009) (arguing that the Board 
could require employers to provide unions with some access to company premises). 
 207.  Litton Sys. Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) 
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throughout a union organizing campaign.  Most critically, existing law per-
mits the employer to prevent the union from coming to the workplace to pre-
sent opposing views.208 
Captive audience speeches originally were not permitted under the 
NLRA.  In 1946, the Board ruled that they were a per se violation of workers’ 
Section 7 right to organize, because they were “calculated to, and do[], inter-
fere with the selection of a representative of the employees’ choice.”209  How-
ever, the Taft-Hartley Act210 of 1947 amended Section 8(c) of the statute, 
which now provides: 
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissem-
ination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, 
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under 
any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains 
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.211 
As a result of this language, the Board reversed course and held, in In 
re Babcock & Wilcox Co., that captive audience speeches do not violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(1).212  For two years, the Board required companies to allow unions 
to make similar speeches in reply,213 but the Board reversed this equal-access 
rule in 1953.214 
One might think that the final provison of Section 8(c), permitting cam-
paigning that “contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,” 
would provide employees some measure of protection, but it does not.215  As 
discussed above, a union election without an employer threat is the exception 
rather than the rule, and these threats are not idle—companies fire workers 
for participating in union organizing campaigns more than one-third of the 
time.216 
Paul Secunda has long argued that captive audience meetings amount to 
coercive conduct against workers in derogation of their Section 7 right to 
                                                          
 208.  NLRB v. United Steel Workers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958); NLRB v. Prescott Indus. 
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 212.  77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948). 
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organize.217  Consistent with this, the NLRA should be amended to outlaw 
the captive audience speech or at least to entitle unions to equal access. 
d.  Allow Card-Check Certification 
The original Section 9(c) of the NLRA allowed the Board to “‘take a 
secret ballot election or utilize any other suitable method’”218 to determine 
whether a union had majority support and should be certified as the workers’ 
bargaining representative.219  Until the 1939 Cudahy Packing Co.220 decision 
ended the practice, the Board used card checks—certification without an 
election, upon the Union’s demonstration that it had received signed author-
ization cards from more than half of the workers—as its primary “other suit-
able method.”221  In 1947, Congress formally stripped out the “other suitable 
method” language from Section 9(c) with the Taft-Hartley amendments.222 
Section 9(c) should be re-written to permit certification upon a union’s 
showing of majority support through authorization cards.  This would main-
tain the principle of majority rule, but would permit workers to organize free 
of the intimidation, coercion, and misinformation emanating from employers 
and the anti-union firms they hire typical of many contested elections.  This 
system is used in several Canadian provinces223 and in the United King-
dom,224 and has been advocated by several American labor law scholars.225 
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2.  Restrict Use of Replacement Employees 
Section 7 of the NLRA gives workers the right “to engage in . . . con-
certed activit[y] for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection,”226 and Section 13 specifically states, “[n]othing in this sub-
chapter . . . shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or di-
minish in any way the right to strike . . . .”227  Notwithstanding these statutory 
“guarantees,” dicta from a 1938 Supreme Court decision, which sprung en-
tirely from the Court’s policy preferences,228 has largely eviscerated the strike 
as an effective weapon in unions’ arsenals. 
The case is NLRB v. Mackay Radio,229 and the Court’s formal holding 
upheld the Board’s finding that an employer’s refusal to reinstate union lead-
ers who had led an unsuccessful strike unlawfully discriminated against them 
because of their union activity230 in violation of Section 8(a)(3).231  In dicta, 
the Court made clear that the company’s sin was not in failing to reinstate 
striking workers generally, but in distinguishing among the strikers on the 
basis of union activity.232  The company was permitted, the Court stated, to 
hire replacement workers during a strike, to promise them “permanent” em-
ployment, and at the end of the strike to refuse reinstatement to striking work-
ers in favor of the replacement (presumably anti-, or at least non-union) work-
ers.233 
This “Mackay doctrine” has been much and long-criticized,234 but never 
reversed.  The strike threat—the threat to withhold labor—is by far a union’s 
most potent economic weapon.  The Court, by giving companies the right to 
permanently replace strikers, has significantly weakened the ability of unions 
to negotiate favorable terms at the bargaining table.  An under-appreciated 
effect of the doctrine, however, is its effect on union organizing.  Julius Get-
man illustrates this effect by describing how companies use the doctrine in 
organizing campaigns by making some version of the following argument: 
If the union wins the election I am required to bargain with it, 
which I will do.  But I am not required to accept unreasonable pro-
posals, which this union regularly makes.  I will bargain hard and 
refuse to compromise.  The only way the union can attempt to 
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change my mind is by dragging you out on strike.  If the union 
strikes, I have the right to permanently replace all the strikers.  And 
in a strike situation I will exercise my rights.235 
Section 8(a)(3) should be re-written to make explicit what should have 
been obvious back in 1938—that when a company, after a strike, refuses to 
reinstate returning strikers in favor of replacement workers, the employer 
“discriminates” against the returning strikers on the basis of union activity 
that is protected by Section 13. 
3.  Reverse Restrictions on Union Security Clauses, or Reduce the 
Burden on Unions of Representing Non-Members 
As described in Part II.D,236 unions are required to represent all mem-
bers of a bargaining unit—in both contract negotiation and in grievance res-
olution—regardless of whether the bargaining-unit member is a member of 
the union or pays union dues.  This encourages free-riding, because a worker 
who refuses to join the union representing her bargaining unit gets all the 
benefits of union representation without shouldering any of the cost.  The 
result is bad policy at multiple levels—it is unfair to unions who must repre-
sent workers who do not financially support it, it is unfair to workers who are 
union members because they must pay higher dues to offset the free-riders, 
and it undermines the original policy of the NLRA of encouraging union 
membership. 
The NLRA should be amended to eliminate the free-rider problem.  This 
could be accomplished in either of several ways.  First, and ideally, the statute 
could be amended to require all members of the bargaining unit to contribute 
union dues as if they were full union members—akin to the “closed shop” 
discussed above in Part I.D.  Doubtless some members of the bargaining unit 
will be unhappy because they disagree with the union’s politics or bargaining 
positions.  However, this is a problem in any majority-representation system, 
including political election to Congress.  Moreover, requiring dues payments 
is not forced speech because workers are free at any time to express whatever 
views they have on the union’s political or bargaining subjects.237 
Second, the statute could be amended to require all members of a bar-
gaining unit to contribute at least minimal financial support to the union that 
represents them.  Third, the statute could be amended to allow unions that 
                                                          
 235.  GETMAN, supra note 180, at 68. 
 236.  See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 237.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006).  See gener-
ally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Unequal Treatment? The Speech and Association Rights 
of Employees: Implications of Knox and Harris, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, 
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represent state employees to bargain for security clauses that require all mem-
bers of a bargaining unit to contribute at least minimal support to the union.  
A fourth alternative would be to relax the exclusivity principle so that unions 
are not required to represent nonmembers in bargaining and grievances. 
B.  New Medicine 
The prescriptions described in Part IV.A all are variations on themes 
earlier advocated by others. Part IV.B argues for new medicine to re-invig-
orate labor, including enhancing remedies for labor law violations to include 
criminal law sanctions, expanding labor protections to workers in the on-de-
mand economy, and changing the default on union representation from opt-
in so that instead of assuming that workers are unorganized until they vote 
for union representation, they are in unless and until they opt out. 
1.  Enhance Remedies to Include Criminal Law Sanctions 
Remedies for company violations of the rules governing union elections 
are notoriously impotent.  Such remedies come in three flavors: Gissel bar-
gaining orders, reinstatement of discriminated-against employees with back 
pay, and cease-and-desist/notice orders. 
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.238 seemed to raise 
the possibility that companies committing egregiously unfair labor practices 
in union elections could be ordered to bargain with a union regardless of the 
election results in two different situations: (1) when the employer’s unfair 
labor practices were so outrageous and pervasive that they prevented the un-
ion from ever getting a majority, and (2) when the union had a previous ma-
jority but the company used unfair labor practices to destroy that majority.239  
However, the Board has only issued two orders in the first situation,240 and 
now maintains it lacks authority to do so.241  Bargaining orders in the second 
situation are almost as rare242 and, even when ordered, ineffective at creating 
stable bargaining relationships between companies and unions.243 
The second type of remedy is reinstatement with back pay for workers 
fired during an organizing drive for participating in the union campaign.  
Fines, consequential damages, and punitive damages are not permitted, and 
                                                          
 238.  395 U.S. 575 (1969).  
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 240.  Bethel & Melfi, supra note 239. 
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wages earned elsewhere are deducted.244  But reinstatement is a woefully in-
adequate remedy for three reasons: (1) it only comes three to five years after 
the election is over245—so during the election, employees witness not the 
power of labor law to correct employer misconduct, but instead the em-
ployer’s violation of that law with apparent impunity;246 (2) fired employees 
offered reinstatement often do not accept it, either because they rationally 
fear employer retaliation or because they have found new jobs;247 and (3) 
nearly eighty percent of “reinstated” workers are gone permanently within a 
year or two, often because the employer has found another excuse for dis-
charge.248  Nor is back pay an effective deterrent, because the cost to a com-
pany of back pay is usually far less than the cost of losing an organizing 
drive.249 
The third remedy is the cease-and-desist/notice order.  A cease-and-de-
sist order tells the company to go-and-sin-no-more.  A notice order requires 
the company to post, for sixty days, a notice informing workers of the sub-
stantive obligations of the order and promising not to engage in future un-
lawful activity.250  Both are toothless.  One commentator explains: 
[These orders] acknowledge[] that an employee’s rights have been 
violated, but then offer[] a solution so inconsequential to both the 
employer and the employee as to be insulting to the employee and 
merely inconvenient to the employer.  The entire notion that a “no-
tice” is capable of making the aggrieved employee whole or deter-
ring a willfully violative employer from committing future of-
fenses is at best comical.  Further, calling this remedy a “significant 
sanction” dilutes the promises of the NLRA by paying them only 
pacifying lip service.251 
In the election context, the remedy might include rerunning the election.  But 
that just means more delay, which usually benefits the employer because it 
provides more time to mount an anti-union campaign as described above. 
                                                          
 244.  See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940) (forbidding the Board from is-
suing penalties or fines); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197–98 (1941) (requiring the 
Board to deduct mitigating earnings).  
 245.  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 185, at 3. 
 246.  HEINSZ ET AL., supra note 64, at 414. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
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Thus, for more than thirty years now companies have been violating la-
bor laws with impunity.252  Worse, the violations have become so deeply in-
grained that illegal behavior is now accepted as the norm; “workers have be-
come resigned to the fact that no branch of government [i]s going to listen to 
their pleas that the system [i]s not just broken, but that it [i]s operating in 
direct violation of the law.”253 
A strong dose of new medicine is needed and should come in the form 
of criminal sanctions for willful employer violations of the NLRA.  Criminal 
sanctions are rare in labor and employment cases, but not unprecedented.  For 
example, Section 17(e) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act provides: 
Any employer who willfully violates any standard, rule, or order 
promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or of any regula-
tions prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and that violation caused 
death to any employee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a 
fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more 
than six months, or by both; except that if the conviction is for a 
violation committed after a first conviction of such person, punish-
ment shall be by a fine of not more than $20,000 or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or by both.254 
Similarly, Section 820(d) of the Mine Safety Act makes it a crime to 
willfully violate a mine health or safety standard and imposes a sentence of 
up to one year in jail for a first offense and up to five years for subsequent 
offenses.255 
In April 2016, Donald Blankenship, C.E.O. of Massey Energy and one 
of the wealthiest people in Appalachia, was sentenced by a federal court to a 
year in prison for willfully violating mine safety regulations, resulting in the 
death of twenty-nine West Virginian miners.256  The conviction and sentenc-
ing made national headlines,257 and signaled that mine safety laws are im-
portant. 
The laws that ostensibly protect workers trying to organize a union are 
important also.  It is doubtful that many executives will need to be imprisoned 
                                                          
 252.  Most scholars date the flagrant disregard of labor law to President Reagan’s discharge of 
striking PATCO workers.  See Joseph A. McCartin, The Strike That Busted Unions, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/opinion/reagan-vs-patco-the-strike-that-
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frontation with the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, or Patco, undermined the bar-
gaining power of American workers and their labor unions.”). 
 253.  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 185, at 25. 
 254.  29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2012). 
 255.  30 U.S.C. § 820(d) (2012). 
 256.  Alan Blinder, Donald Blankenship Sentenced to a Year in Prison in Mine Safety Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/us/donald-blankenship-sen-
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 257.  Id. 
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for workers’ rights to become more respected.  After all, “it was not necessary 
to hang many gentlemen of quality before the understanding became general 
that dueling was not required by the code of honour.”258 
2.  Expand NLRA Protection to On-Demand Workers 
As described in Part II.F above, there is substantial current litigation 
over whether gig workers are “independent contractors” instead of “employ-
ees.”259  Nearly all of this litigation has occurred in the context of wage, hour, 
and benefit disputes,260 not in the context of whether the workers can organize 
into unions.261  To ensure that the benefits of collective bargaining are avail-
able to workers in the gig economy, the following three things should occur: 
First, courts and the NLRB should classify gig-economy workers, such 
as Uber drivers, as employees under the NLRA as well as under the other 
employment statutes.262 
Second, the NLRA should be amended to narrow or remove the Section 
2 exclusion of independent contractors,263 and the federal antitrust laws 
should be amended to ensure that they are not interpreted as applying to col-
lective bargaining involving such workers.264  This way, even if gig-economy 
workers are classified as independent contractors, they will be protected by 
labor laws.  As Catherine Fisk’s work with Hollywood writers demonstrates, 
collective bargaining is entirely appropriate for workers who have many of 
the characteristics of independent contractors.265  Alternatively, the NLRA 
should be rewritten to recognize a new category of “independent workers”266 
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for workers in the gig economy, and to recognize that these workers are en-
titled to organize and collectively bargain for the terms and conditions under 
which they work.267 
Third, an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of organizing and 
bargaining should be interpreted broadly.  The NLRA Section 9(b) gives the 
Board the authority to define an appropriate bargaining unit for a given work-
place,268 and establishes procedures for doing so.269  The Board should inter-
pret this to include not only physical workplaces but also virtual ones. 
An example of how this might work in practice is provided by the recent 
emergence of a union-like association in Seattle.270  In December 2015, the 
City of Seattle enacted an ordinance271 to permit for-hire drivers to organize 
and elect representatives to bargain on their behalf with the companies that 
direct their work for better compensation rates and other contract terms.  The 
goal of the ordinance is “[l]eveling the bargaining power between for-hire 
drivers and the entities that control many aspects of their working condi-
tions.”272  The City Council specifically found: 
Business models wherein companies control aspects of their driv-
ers’ work, but rely on the drivers being classified as independent 
contractors, render for-hire drivers exempt from minimum labor 
requirements that the City of Seattle has deemed in the interest of 
public health and welfare, and undermine Seattle’s efforts to create 
opportunities for all workers in Seattle to earn a living wage.273 
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The Seattle ordinance establishes a procedure (1) for organizations to 
register as qualified driver representatives (“QDR”), and (2) for drivers to 
select from among those QDRs an exclusive driver representative (“EDR”) 
to be the exclusive representative of for-hire drivers operating in the city for 
a particular on-demand company.274  A QDR becomes an EDR by submitting 
to the Director of the City’s Finance and Administrative Services (“Direc-
tor”) “statements of interest” from qualified drivers that “clearly state that the 
driver wants to be represented by the QDR for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining.”275 
Once an EDR is certified, the EDR and the company must meet and 
bargain over vehicle standards, safe driving practices, the nature and amount 
of payments to be made, minimum work hours, and work rules.276  If the 
parties reach agreement, the agreement must be reduced to writing277 and cer-
tified by the Director,278 after which it becomes final and binding on all par-
ties.279  If the parties fail to agree, the ordinance requires interest arbitration 
upon either party’s request.280 
In March 2016, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued the City of Seattle 
in federal court to declare the ordinance unlawful and enjoin its enforce-
ment.281  In its complaint, the Chamber argued that the ordinance violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act and was preempted by the NLRA.282  In August, the 
court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that because the ordinance had not yet 
been implemented, the Chamber had not yet been harmed and so lacked 
standing to sue.283  The judge left the door open for the chamber to re-file the 
suit at a later time.  In January 2017, the ordinance went into effect, and the 
Chamber almost immediately filed to reinstate its suit.284  In April 2017, the 
judge enjoined the ordinance pending consideration of the legal issues posed 
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by the ordinance.285  In August 2017, the judge denied the Chamber’s motion 
for an injunction pending appeal.286[We’ll want to update this, if appropriate, 
before the article goes to press.] 
The Seattle ordinance illustrates that gig-economy work is compatible 
with unions and collective bargaining.  Ironically, a finding by the NLRB or 
the courts that gig-economy workers are “employees” covered by the NLRA 
would probably result in a finding of NLRA preemption.  However, preemp-
tion of the Seattle ordinance would be a small price to pay for opening the 
door for gig-economy workers across the country to organize. 
3.  Presume That Workers Are in a Union Until They Opt Out 
The NLRA presumes that workers are not organized in a union until 
they petition for and win a union election.  Workers wishing to form an elec-
tion must file with the NLRB a petition alleging that a “substantial num-
ber”287 (“interpreted by the Board to be 30%”288) of the employees wish to be 
represented by collective bargaining.289  The Board then investigates the pe-
tition, may hold hearings to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and 
other issues, and (usually after a vigorous anti-union campaign by the em-
ployer290) holds an election.291  The union must win fifty percent of the votes 
plus one to become certified as the workers’ bargaining representative—a tie 
goes to the employer.292 
The presumption that employees are nonunion until they affirmatively 
elect to be in one can and should be reversed.293  There is no absolute reason 
for the current presumption.  For example, in Continental Europe, statutes 
provide that workers are represented by (1) “works councils that operate at 
the firm level” to create an avenue for employer-employee consultation, and 
(2) “trade unions that operate at the multi-employer level to negotiate wages 
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and other economic terms” of employment.294  If strong public policy favors 
the right of workers to belong to organizations of their own choosing, to en-
gage in strikes and other concerted activity, and to use their collective eco-
nomic power to compel employers to bargain meaningfully with them over 
the terms and conditions of employment, the presumption against union 
membership should be reversed, and workers should be presumed in until 
they elect out. 295 
A recent example of how a shift from opt-in to opt-out can have dra-
matic results is provided by the rules governing 401(k) plans.  Employers 
have shifted their retirement plans from defined benefit (traditional pensions) 
to defined contribution (retirement savings accounts) plans.296  Defined con-
tribution plans require employees to set their level of savings and to manage 
the investments in their retirement plans.297  However, American workers are 
notoriously bad at both.  Many workers eligible to participate in a 401(k) do 
not;298 those who do, save too little299 and invest it poorly.300 
Recognizing a looming crisis301 in American retirement plans, Con-
gress, in the Pension Protection Act of 2006302 (“PPA”), changed two key 
default rules for 401(k)s.  First, it changed the default rule on whether to 
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participate by creating an “automatic enrollment” feature, under which em-
ployees can be made to opt out of a 401(k) plan instead of having to opt in.303  
Participation rates immediately skyrocketed from about 50% to 85%.304  Sec-
ond, the PPA permitted qualified default investment alternatives 
(“QDIAs”).305  QDIAs changed the default rules on how much to save and 
on investment allocation decisions—through a QDIA, an employer can put a 
fixed percentage of the employee’s salary into an appropriately diversified 
group of mutual fund investments.306 
These PPA rules are default rules, so workers can still opt out of partic-
ipation, drop their savings rate to one percent of their salary, and pile their 
entire retirement portfolio into company stock.  But they don’t—they tend to 
stay in the plan and to stick with the default contribution levels and invest-
ment options.307  Basic principles of behavioral economics explain that cog-
nitive biases such as inertia (a preference for the status quo) often lead people 
to behave sub-optimally (economically irrationally).308  Changing default 
rules changes behavior.309 
Just as changing the default rules for 401(k)s from opt-in to opt-out in-
creased participation, so too would changing the default rules for worker or-
ganization.  This would not require a radical redesign of our labor laws—just 
minor tinkering with NLRA Section 9.  It would preserve free choice because 
workers could always opt out, either by initially electing non-representation 
or through a decertification election.310  It would not eliminate the need for 
elections—where more than one union seeks to represent a set of workers, 
the workers would need to make a selection—but the Board already has elec-
tion procedures in place for that.311  It would almost certainly increase worker 
participation in unions dramatically. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Earnings equality in the United States is and has for some time been 
going in the wrong direction, with dire economic and political consequences.  
At least some of the trend can be tied directly to declining unions.  Reversing 
union decline—and therefore income inequality—will require a major over-
haul of American labor law.  This Article provides both old and new policy 
prescriptions for doing so. 
                                                          
  When a union is already in place, a competing union may file an election petition if 
the labor contract has expired or is about to expire, and it can show interest by at least 
30% of the employees.  This would normally result in a three-way election, with the 
choices being the incumbent labor union, the challenging one, and “none.”  If none of the 
three receives a majority vote, a runoff will be conducted between the top two vote-get-
ters. 
Id. 
